

## MEWATIS UNDER THE MAMLUK DYNASTY

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The establishment of the Sultanate and its capital at Mehrauli (South Delhi), which was one of the most important cities of that time, affected the Meos, being seen by them as the appropriation of Meo land. Not surprisingly, their raids were incursions into the new capital, affecting traders, pilgrims, and the water carriers at the city's major sources of water. The concentration of Meo Settlements when they forge their presence onto the pages of history in the mid-thirteenth century is in the region South of the capital called Mewat. Mewat derives its name from the ferocious Mewati.<sup>1</sup> In the mid-thirteenth century they inhabited settlements around the periphery of Delhi, in the Siwalik hills (in the contemporary state of Haryana), Bayana, and in the Kohpaya.<sup>2</sup> The Kohpaya includes Bharatpur, Dholpur, and a part of Jaipur and Alwar that Stretches up to Ranthambhor.<sup>3</sup> This became the heartland of Meo resistance against the Sultans of Delhi.

The Strategic location of Mewat had manifold implications firstly, from the economic point of view, its suitability for the growth of rich cash crops like indigo and cotton rendered it in the eyes of the sultans of Delhi an extremely viable source of revenue. Mewat was a crucial Link between the parts of Gujarat and its up country hinter and has also been stressed upon the eminent scholars.<sup>4</sup> Hence, any political disturbance in the region of Mewat would perhaps reflects itself in the

- <sup>1</sup>. A Significant population of Meo still lives in the villages that have how been incorporated into Delhi. T.N. (Eng. Trans E.D., Vol. 2), p. 375.
- <sup>2</sup>. Hashim Amir Ali, op. cit., p. 1-2. Siddiqu Ahmed Meo, Mewati Sanskrit, p. 12.
- <sup>3</sup>. Dr. Shamsuddin Shamsh, Meos of India, p. 17. Maya Ram, Rajasthan District Gazetter, Alwar, p. 46. T.N. (Raverty), p. 818, Habibullah, op. cit., pp. 152-53.
- <sup>4</sup>. Ashin Dasgupta, Trade and Politics in (18<sup>th</sup> India, in Islam and the Trade of Asia, ed. D.S. Richards, Oxford and Dennysylvania, 1970.

description of trade between Gujarat and Gangetic Doab. Finally, control over mewat was crucial for the central authorities since a hostile power based in the Mewat region could have threatened the safety of Delhi, the seat of imperial power. These considerations were to a great extent responsible in shaping the policy of central authority towards the mewatis. According to sources, the attitude of the Meos ever since the establishment of the Turkish rule has been one of hostility. Their conflict with the imperial power continued intermittently till the downfall of the Mughal empire, though its intensity varied over time. The nature of their conflicts and its impact on the fortunes of the people of mewat forms the subject of the study of political history.

The geographical features of the Mewat region influenced the course of its political history. The hilly region<sup>5</sup> offered not only considerable protection against external attacks but was a veritable strong hold too. Although Mewat was often prone to invasions due to its proximity to Delhi; the striking fact that emerges is that upto the beginning of the 16<sup>th</sup> Century the chief clans of Mewat could not be brought under total subjugation for any considerable length of time.<sup>6</sup>

Right from establishment of Turkish rule in India, the Mewat region attracted the attention of the Delhi Sultans. The constant tussle between the Sultans of Delhi and the chieftains of Mewat was characteristic feature of their relationship. It was after the death of Aibek, the Hindu chieftains of Jalor and Ranthambhor had overthrown the yoke of the Turks and there was a general loosening in the control of Delhi over the different areas of the empire. Iltutmish, the Sultan of Delhi started his campaigns against Ranthambhor and captured the fortress after a long siege.<sup>7</sup> He also attained success in Bayana, Thangir and Mewat.<sup>8</sup> Iltutmish was able to establish control over these regions and they remained relatively peaceful during his reign.<sup>9</sup> Apart from

<sup>5</sup>. TFS, (Trans. E.D., Vol. 3), p. 103, Ferishta, (Eng. Trans. Briggs), pp. 131-142.

<sup>6</sup>. Baber Nama (Eng. Trans (Beverage)), p. 368-69.

<sup>7</sup>. T.N., (Eng. Trans. E.D. Vol. 2), pp. 324-25; Habibullah, foundation, pp. 152-153.

<sup>8</sup>. Maya Ram, Rajasthan District Gazetters, Alwar, p. 47.

<sup>9</sup>. Peter Jackson, op. cit., pp. 132-33.

these campaigns we do not hear of any conflict and any campaign against these regions during the Iltutmish period.

The Meos, who appear to have been loosely subject to the Chauhan kings of Ranthambhar, and whose depredation reached across Hariyana in the north and to Bhayana in the east.<sup>10</sup> Sultanate outposts had been created in this tract at Riwari, Narnawl, Palwal and Kama, which appear as iqta's under Iltutmish and his immediate successors: Rewari was for a time the assignment of Balban, who early in his career is said to have reduced to obedience 'the mawasat of the Kuhpaya.'<sup>11</sup>

But after Iltutmish's death none of his successors took up seriously the task of holding Mewat under control. Due to the slacking of the central authority, the Meos emboldened, posed a serious law and order problem to the Sultans of Delhi. Taking advantage of the hilly terrain the large size and density of the jungles<sup>12</sup> in that region, the Meos succeeded in extending their marauding activities upto the outer walls of Delhi. So much did they become troublesome that the contemporary writer Minhaj was constrained to remark in 1259 that they had become a terror even to the devil.<sup>13</sup> The plundering raids of the Meos went on increasing largely on account of the incompetence of the successors of Iltutmish, the mewatis had become so emboldened as to infest the jungles lying to the south Delhi, and to attack there the travellers going southwards. Thus, they had created a situation which called for immediate action. In 1249, therefore Nasiruddin Mahmud, the reigning sultan, directed Ulugh Khan to conduct a Campaign against them. But this period being one of general disorder throughout northern India, ulugh Khan could not achieve anything beyond effecting some destruction of Mewati property and collection of some booty.<sup>14</sup>

<sup>10</sup>. T.N. (Eng. Trans. Lavery), p. 818.

<sup>11</sup>. T.N. (tran. Raverty), pp. 726, 730, 790; and for Balban, p. 806-07; for Kama, in the Bharatpur territory, 39m N.W. of Mathura, at 27° 40'N., 77°20'E., See Raverty, p. 790, n. 9; for Palwal, see also shuaib 'Inscription from Palwal', p. 2-3; RCEA, XD, 56. 72-3 (nos. 3678, 3703).

<sup>12</sup>. TFS, (Eng. Tran. E.D., Vol. 3), p. 103, T.N. (trans. Raverty), p. 850.

<sup>13</sup>. T.N., (tran. Raverty), p. 850.

<sup>14</sup>. T.N., (tarns. Raverty), pp. 850-51; fErishta, (Eng. Tr. Briggs), p. 131.

They were not afraid to provide assistance to recalcitrant shamsis as they battled the authority of Delhi. As Ulugh Khan's rival, Qutlugh Khan, a Shamsi Malik who, had set up base in Awadh after his expulsion from Delhi. When Qutlugh Khan found it impossible to continue his conflict with Ulugh Khan in Awadh (1257), he marched into the mawas until he came to Santur (Capital of Sirmur) in the foothills of the Himalayas. Mawas<sup>15</sup> was a difficult terrain, a 'natural fastness' for Local chieftains outside the control of the Sultanate. As asserted by Hodivala: 'Mawas was a tract or district which was a sort of Sanctuary or place of refuge on account of the physical features which made it a natural fastness.'<sup>16</sup> Within the context of the court-centric Sultanate records, mawas carried with it the sense of 'disturbed, troubled territory' in the control of a rebel, which as described by Habib,<sup>17</sup> in his study of the Sultanate economy, translated as 'rebellious areas'.

Qutlugh Khan in the Sirmur region, he received assistance from the local non-Muslim population as Minhaj<sup>18</sup> explained that it was the custom amongst these people to offer sanctuary. Because of the Sanctuary rendered to Shamsi Slave, Qutlugh Khan, he was managed to escape Ulugh Khan. In the years of conflict in the post-Iltutmish period Shamsi notables had built up personal networks of alliance with the local chiefs to overthrow the yoke of the Sultanate. Other than overcoming the challenge of the Shamsi notables, it was the possibility of the Meos combine that Ulugh Khan had to counter to make Delhi paramount in North India.

But the weak personality of the Sultan coupled with the intrigues of Imamudin Rihan<sup>19</sup> and the dismissal and disgrace of Ulugh Khan must have made action against Mewatis difficult. They could therefore continue on a course of mischievous activities. They were emboldened enough to take actions such as, under the

<sup>15</sup>. Mawas's plural Mawasat.

<sup>16</sup>. Hodivala, pp. 226-9; T.N., (trans. Raverty), p. 850-53, and the description for the mawas faced by Ulugh Khan on one of his Campaign 'Chun tafriqa bar Ishan rah Yaff won Jangalha – yi Hindustan wa ma-a' iq-i-lorha wa ihlifal-i-ashjar-ibisyar... (As their paths were – separated (because) of the dense forests of Hindustan and the torrential gorges and the extremely dense woods....

<sup>17</sup>. Irfan Habib, 'Slavery', in the Cambridge Economic History, Vol. I, p. 90.

<sup>18</sup>. T.N. (trans. Raverty),

<sup>19</sup>. Ferishta, (Eng. Iran. Briggs), p. 132-33.

leadership of their chief named Malka,<sup>20</sup> a Hindu of gigantic stature, they in 1257, committed an imprudent robbery of the transport camels belonging to Ulugh Khan's officers, on the eve of one of his projected campaigns against the Mongols. This action of the Mewatis had aroused Balban's personal resentment, and when he was free from the activities of the Mongols, we decided to deal with the rebels of Mewat. It was reported that they were seizing cattles from the neighbouring areas of Hansi and Bayana.<sup>21</sup> The Meos were challenging the central authority in collusion with the Chauhans of Ranthambhor.<sup>22</sup> This is evident from the fact that animals stolen by the Mewatis were invariably passed on to the Chauhans.<sup>23</sup> The trade links were also disrupted between Delhi and Gujarat due to the marauding activities of the Mewatis. Barani writes that the roads were rendered unprotected on all sides to Delhi, and it was impossible for the carvanas and the traders to come or depart.<sup>24</sup> All this forced Ulugh Khan to take stern action against the Mewatis. On 29<sup>th</sup> January 1260, he therefore left Delhi<sup>25</sup> with an army of 10,000 soldiers, and in a single forced march penetrated upto 50 kas<sup>26</sup> and took the rebels completely by surprise. For twenty days the work of slaughter and pillage continued in the region. In order to achieve quick result, Balban ordered the reward of one silver Tanka for every head, soon activated themselves and without caring geographical difficulties they began to bring forth either the heads of the rebels or living prisoners from amongst them.<sup>27</sup> The Afghan Section of the imperial army was particularly active, perhaps due their background

<sup>20</sup>. T.N., (trans. Raverty), p. 850; Habib and Nizami, the early Turkish Sultans of Delhi, Comprehensive, Vol. V, p. 273.

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<sup>22</sup>. Habibullaha, Foundation, pp. 153-54, Habib and Nizami, the Early Turkish Sultans of Delhi, Comprehensive, p. 273.

<sup>23</sup>. T.N. (tran. Raverty), p. 851.

<sup>24</sup>. T.F.S., (tran. E.D. Vol. 3), p. 104.

<sup>25</sup>. T.N., (tran. Raverty), p. 850-6, 864, Badaoni (Eng. Tr. Ranking Vol. I), however, gives a wrong impression that Sultan Mahmud had himself conducted this campaign, TMS (Basu tran.) ferishta, (trn. Briggs), p. 135, agrees with T.N.

<sup>26</sup>. T.N., (tran. Raverty), p. 850, Cunningham ASI XX, 13, incorrectly says that during this campaign Balban had captured two important towns called santur and Salmur which he identifies with indore and Alwar respectively, see Hodivala, p. 227-229 for correct location of these places which were not in Mewat.

<sup>27</sup>. T.N. (trans. Raverty), p. 852, Ferishta, (tran. Briggs), p. 135.

of a hilly region. Minhaj goes to the length of saying that each one of them brought at least one hundred Hindu prisoners. The rebel Malka was arrested with his entire family together with 250 other leading men of the tribe.<sup>28</sup> Besides this, 142 horses were captured and six bags of tankas amounting to thirty five thousand tankas were taken from the ranas of the hills and sent to the royal treasury.<sup>29</sup>

In twenty days Ulugh Khan accomplished this task with great bravery and then returned to the royal court. A grant court was organized for him by the Sultan near Hauz-i-Pani to celebrate the victory. The maliks, amirs, men of wealth, and the wrestlers were bestowed the Khilat or valuable robes of honour, on the previous day. Two days later the prisoners were publicly massacred. Some of them were trampled to death by elephants, others were cut to pieces by the Turkish Soldiery and several hundreds were flayed alive.<sup>30</sup> Thus, in his own ruthless way Ulugh Khan tried to curb the menace of the rebellious neighbours.

Evidently the victory was a shallow one, for two days later another campaign had to be undertaken against the Mewatis. Describing the campaign Minhaj writes "The army departed from Hauz Rani with the order that elephants who can cause instant death be used against the infidels, the blood shedding Turks got their swords ready to kill the rebels. Several rebels were killed under the feet of the elephants. Several hundred rebel Hindus were skinned with knives. Their skins stuffed with straw they were hung over the city gates. Such stringent punishment had never been given at Hauz Rani or in front of the gates of Delhi, nor had anyone ever heard tales of it having occurred previously."<sup>31</sup> Minhaj's fulsome narrative might easily persuade us that the Meos had been suppressed for all time, but for Barani's<sup>32</sup> claim that during the reigns of Iltutmish's off springs the Meos had continued unchecked, so that they were robbing the mansions (saraiha) in the neighbourhood of Delhi.

<sup>28</sup>. *Ibid.*, p. 852.

<sup>29</sup>. *Ibid.*, p. 853.

<sup>30</sup>. Describing about the punishment that were inflicted, Minhaj says that never before were such several punishments given publicly, T.N. (Tr. Raverty), pp. 854-55.

<sup>31</sup>. T.N. (trans. Raverty), p. 854-55

<sup>32</sup>. TFS (trans. E.D., Vol. 3), p. 104-05, Peter Jackson, the Delhi Sultanate, p. 128.

The Mewatis, however, continued to the defiant. Minhaj asserts that in January–February 1260, Ulugh Khan sent into the hills of Delhi to suppress the Mewatis, "who terrorize even ghosts."<sup>33</sup> About ten thousand brave horsemen in armor were with him. In this campaign great wealth was taken and many cattle were captured.<sup>34</sup>

Despite the war and harsh punishment inflicted by Ulugh Khan, the relatives of many of the rebels took to flee, escaping the sword. They took refuge in different areas of the kohpaya. Once again they resumed their rebellious activities, began to plunder Muslims, and terrorize people. Spies were sent forth to identify their whereabouts.

Minjah's stigmatization of the Mewatis and particularly their leader, Malka, is stark. Minjah describes Malka as a mischief monger and the chief of the rebels (*mufsid*). He is arrogant, disobedient, refractory, and rebellious (*nafarman*, *Sarkash*), and an infidel (*gabri*). He refuses to accept authority and is dangerous like the devil (*devsati hindah*)<sup>35</sup> The Arabic metaphor of poisonous snakes is used for them meaning that they were terrible people who can inject poison into other bodies.

In the series of transformations that are made by the Persian texts, war is read as disorder, and power is marked by the claims to establish the social contract. Minhaj<sup>36</sup> constructs the Mewatis as given to raids and plunder. He acknowledges their continued defiance of authority expressed in their raiding of cattle and camels and in their creation of commotion among other Hindus to whom all land up to Ranthambhor had been distributed.<sup>37</sup> This indicates a possible alliance of the Mewatis with the Bhattis and Chauhan Rajputs.<sup>38</sup>

The geographical features of Mewat and the old rebellious habits of the Mewatis made them challenge the authority of Delhi Sultans once again. They had

<sup>33</sup>. T.N. (trans. Raverty), p. 863.

<sup>34</sup>. *Ibid.*, p. 863.

<sup>35</sup>. T.N. (tran. E.D. Vol. 2), p. 380. This indicates an inversion of the Hindu classification of dev (Deity) and asura. In the early Vedic period, Persian and Indian deities were common until later conflicts arose and the Indian dev became the Persian term for devilish.

<sup>36</sup>. T.N.

<sup>37</sup>. Ferishta, (Eng. Tr. Briggs, Vol. I), p. 131, Habib and Nizami, *The early Turkish Sultans of Delhi*, Comprehensive, Vol. V, p. 273.

<sup>38</sup>. Shail Mayaram, *against History, against State*, p. 84.

temporarily bowed down to the might of the imperial arms again. Balban, on his part must also have seen the transitory nature of his earlier success. He must have noticed the fresh activities of the rebels, and would have realized how they, by challenging the state power in the vicinity of the Capital, constituted a psychological pointer to the weakness and incompetence of the imperial Government.<sup>39</sup> Therefore, immediately after his accession, Balban planned a definite policy of action against Mewat.<sup>40</sup> His hands were more free now as he no longer a minister pursuing a dictated policy but was a sovereign himself. The result was that even before the end of the first year of his reign, he decided to deal with this problem in right earnest.<sup>41</sup>

Destroying the Meos who were a major source of disorder, was Balban's most important priority according to Barani.<sup>42</sup> More than Minhaj, Barani builds up the legitimation of Balban's incisive military action. The Meos are described as having grown in numbers. They become emboldened and a particularly threatening force because of the dissolute habits and incapacity of the elder sons<sup>43</sup> of Iltutmish and the immaturity of his youngest, Nasir al-Din (Balban's immediate predecessor), who had become sultan at the age of twenty. The populace, in general, has become disorderly. Barani asserts, that "after the death of Iltutmish none could control the rebellion of the Meos. For this purpose Balabn left the city and camped outside it."<sup>44</sup>

The use of the term 'mufsidan'<sup>45</sup> for the Meos, derived from Minhaj, continues; the image becomes an indelible one "At night they would attack the city, plunder homes, giving all kinds of trouble to subjects so that people could not even sleep. They had destroyed houses in the neighbourhood of Delhi."<sup>46</sup> The routes of the city from all four sides are closed. The caravanas of grain dealers and the merchants dare not come because of the disorders.

<sup>39</sup>. Ferishta, (Eng. Tr. Briggs, Vol. I), p. 129,. TFS, (Eng. Tr. E.D., Vol. 3), p. 98.

<sup>40</sup>. Ferishta, (Eng. Tr. Briggs, Vol. I), p. 142, TFS, (Eng. Tr. E.D., Vol. 3), p. 103-104.

<sup>41</sup>. Ferishta, (Eng. Tr. Briggs, Vol. I), p. 142, TFS, (Eng. Tr. E.D., Vol. 3), p. 104-05, Peter Jackson, The Delhi Sultanate, p. 128.

<sup>42</sup>. TFS, (Eng. Tr. E.D. Vol. 3), p. 103-04; Ferishta, (trd. Briggs, Vol. I), p. 142.

<sup>43</sup>. TFS, (Eng. Tr. E.D., Vol. 3), p. 104.

<sup>44</sup>. *Ibid.*

<sup>45</sup>. T.N.

<sup>46</sup>. TFS, (Eng. Tr. E.D., Vol. 3), p. 104, Ferishta, (Eng. Td. Briggs, Vol. I), p. 142.



The Meos are described as having been one of the major sources of disturbance for the capital. Barani writes, 'For fear of their plunder the western gates to the city have to be closed after the afternoon prayer. The Punjab route is closed. None dares to emerge after the evening prayer to go to the tank of Hauz Sultani or visit the graves of ancestors for pilgrimage as they are prove to being disturbed by warfarers. Several meos gather in the evenings at the time of prayer around the Hauz, where they trouble the Sakkas or water carriers, and they take away women's clothes. The fear of Meos has caused great commotion in Delhi.'<sup>47</sup>

The State is represented as weak and passive; the Meos are the aggressors, wrecking the fragility of the new found state. They are the 'fasadis' who upset the "order" of Delhi personified by the Sultanate, which is the agency to counter disorder. They rob highways and disrupt trade and travel; virtually besiege Delhi; upset sacred prayer and pilgrimage; assault people at work; and worse, molest women.<sup>48</sup>

It took Balban a year to implement his military solution: the Sultan's sword delivered many followers of God from the assaults and killing of the enemy.<sup>49</sup> The clearance of woods around Delhi was the first step in dealing with them. Barani asserts that in the very first year of his reign Balban begins cutting the forests near Delhi in order to destroy the Meos, a task that lasts an entire year. The rebels of the Doab and other areas of Hindustan had been taking refuge there and indulging in looting and dacoity.<sup>50</sup> Ferista informs us later that "the jungle in the neighbourhood" is an eight mile tract of forest. State action is necessitated in "retaliation" against the Meo menace.<sup>51</sup>

<sup>47</sup>. TFS, (Eng. Tr. E.D., Vol. 3), p. 104, stripping women, as according to English translation, is pushing the word barhana to an extreme. It could also mean taking jewelry or an item of clothing. The Hauz Shams, a major water reservoir named after Iltutmish, was built in 1229-30 and covered a thousand acres of land.

<sup>48</sup>. TFS, (Eng. Tr. E.D., Vol. 3), p. 104, shail mayaram, against, p. 85; Peter Jackson, The Delhi Sultanate, p. 128.

<sup>49</sup>. TFS, (Eng. Tr. E.D., Vol. 3), p. 104-05, Peter Jackson, p. 128, According to Barani, one hundred thousand of the royal army were killed by the Mewatis, but ferishta appears to correct when he says that Balban put hundred thousand of the enemy to sword, Ferishta, (tr. Briggs, Vol. I), p. 142.

<sup>50</sup>. TFS, (Hindi tran. Rizvi), Adi Turkalin Bharat, p. 193.

<sup>51</sup>. Ferishta, (Eng. Tran. Bruggs), p. 225.

This was followed by military activity. The Meo menace is the justification for further militarization. A fort was built at Gopalgiri and several posts were established near the city.<sup>52</sup> Barani completely ignores the disruptive effects of empire. Barani writes that Balban handed over the towns and villages of the Gangetic Doabs to distinguished persons and ordered them to destroy all the villages of the rebels, kill them, take captive their women and children, cut down the forests, and suppress the rebellion.

Another important development that resulted from the political behaviour of Sultan Balban was the establishment of colonies of Afghan soldiers in the new thanas or military posts at these strategic points in the sultanate for rendering the highways safe against dacoits and other anti-social elements. The operations of dacoits and rebel villagers created a problem of great magnitude for the early Sultans of Delhi.<sup>53</sup> It was imperative that a solution to this problem should be found. The people that he chose to repopulate these areas with were the aforementioned Afghans, a new body of social menials to whom he gave rent-free lands (mafruzi) and for whom he established military cantonments such as at Jalali and Gopalgir.<sup>54</sup> Isami<sup>55</sup> also informs us about the constructions of military posts and placing of garrison there. The road to east India was opened with the result that the Karvanas (grain dealers, moving in Carvanas) and merchants could move freely. This was possible owing to the establishment of thanas in the densely forested areas. Ibn Battuta<sup>56</sup> also describes about Afghanpur, a thana established on the bank of the river Ram Ganga in the iqta of Amroha, tends to suggest that every territory affected by the activities of the anti-social elements had thanas.

<sup>52</sup>. TFS, (Hindi tr. Rizvi), Adi Turkalin, p. 194, Peter Jackson, Delhi Sultanate, p. 128.

<sup>53</sup>. I.H. Siddiqui, Authority and Kingship under the Solankars of Delhi (13<sup>th</sup> – 14<sup>th</sup> Centuries), p. 69.

<sup>54</sup>. TFS, (Eng. Tr. E.D. Vol. 3), p. 105, Sunil Kumar, The Emergency of the Delhi Sultanate, p. 335, Hodivala Tentatively Identified Gopalgir as Gopalgarh on the frontier of the Mewati territory, p. 83.

<sup>55</sup>. Tutuh-us-Salatin, (Hindi tr. Rizvi) Adi Turkalin Bharat, p. 304.

<sup>56</sup>. Travels of Ibn Battuta, (Eng. Tr. H. Gikb), Vol. 3, p. 762.

Barani<sup>57</sup> records with great satisfaction that from that time onwards the people became free from the Mewati menace. Balban's Mewat policy had been successful to a large extent as we hardly find any mention of trouble from Mewat for nearly a century. During this period the chiefs of Mewat appear to have maintained satisfactory relations with the authorities at Delhi, Nor we find any mention of the serious activities of the dacoits in the region of Mewat. So far as Balban himself was concerned, he certainly had no more worry on their account for the rest of his reign. Thus, 'by a combination of ruthless massacre, show of military force and wanton destruction', Balban succeeded to a considerable extent in effectively controlling mewat.<sup>58</sup> However, inspite of all these measures, Mewat was still not completely subjugated.

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<sup>57</sup>. TFS, (Eng. Tr. E.D. Vol. 3), p. 105.

<sup>58</sup>. Habib abnd Nizami, The Early Turkish Sultans of Delhi, Comprehensive, pp. 277-78.

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